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I. INTRODUCTION
West Virginia law presumes at-will employment, meaning that the em-
ployee can normally be discharged at the will of the employer.' "The practical
effect of this doctrine . . . is that 'an at-will employee serves at the will and
pleasure of his or her employer and can be discharged at any time, with or with-
out cause.' 2 However, despite its practicality, in most jurisdictions the at-will
employment doctrine is becoming wrought with exceptions that have all but
swallowed the rule. 3 The most common sense exception is that an employer
cannot terminate an employee with a contract of employment for a specific du-
ration without cause.4 In the absence of a written contract, courts can also find
an implied contract of employment. 5 Statutory exceptions to at-will employ-
ment further prohibit discharge of an at-will employee for numerous policy-
based reasons.6 Finally, in many jurisdictions, an employer cannot terminate an
at-will employee if the reason for the termination violates a substantial public
policy - the public policy exception to at-will employment.7 This article dis-
cusses the public policy exception in particular, focusing specifically on West
Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 90 S.E.2d 459, 468 (W. Va. 1955); Bell v.
South Penn Natural Gas Co., 62 S.E.2d. 285, 288 (W. Va. 1950) (holding that without contractual
provisions to the contrary employment may be terminated with or without cause at the will of
either party); Suter v. Harsco Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751, 754 (W. Va. 1991); Feliciano v. 7-Eleven,
Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001).
2 Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 717-18 (quoting Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616,
619 (W. Va. 2000)).
3 See MARK A. RoTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 2-4 (4th ed. 1998).
4 See, e.g., Adkins v. Inco Alloys Int'l, 417 S.E.2d 910 (W. Va. 1992); Williamson v. Shar-
vest Management Co., 415 S.E.2d 271 (W. Va. 1992).
5 See, e.g., Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1988).
6 See infra Part II.C.
7 See infra Part II.D.
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WHAT CONSTITUTES SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY
Virginia's cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on a substantial public
policy. In West Virginia, this exception was introduced by the case of Harless
v. First National Bank ("Harless 1").8
Part I of the article discusses the policies behind at-will employment
and its history in West Virginia. Part II discusses some exceptions that have
crept into the doctrine, both on a state and a federal level. Part III examines
West Virginia's substantial public policy exception. Part IV then discusses
Harless I's progeny, looking at the many cases that have been decided since
Harless I involving claims of retaliatory discharge based on substantial public
policy. These cases are divided into five groups based on the origin of the spe-
cific public policy used as a basis for the retaliatory discharge cause of action in
each case. The groups are 1) the constitution, 2) statutes, 3) common law, 4)
administrative regulations, and 5) an unexplained category known as "other."
Next, Part V discusses the various problems that have come up since (or because
of) Harless I. Part VI recommends greatly restricting the scope of the Harless
public policy exception and returning to the original, more predictable, and truly
at will "at-will employment" analysis. In the alternative, the West Virginia
courts should outline a clearer test for determining what constitutes a "substan-
tial" public policy in West Virginia sufficient to put an employer on notice as to
what kinds of conduct will subject an employer to liability for wrongful dis-
charge.
II. THE HISTORY AND REASONING BEHIND AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
The "[p]revailing doctrine through the nineteenth and most of the twen-
tieth centuries viewed public employment as a 'privilege,' which could be with-
drawn without limitation by the government." 9 Private employment was viewed
in a similar fashion.10 The first credited recognition of the employment-at-will
doctrine was in a 1877 treatise by Horace Wood, which outlined the "American
Rule" for at-will employment." The "American Rule" evidenced a clear depar-
ture from the "English Rule" that presumed yearly hiring.' 2 Under the "Ameri-
8 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) [hereinafter Harless I]. Accordingly, in this article and in
general parlance, a claim for retaliatory discharge based on a substantial public policy in West
Virginia is often referred to as a "Harless claim," "Harless cause of action," or "Harless-type
claim."
9 Robert M. Bastress, A Synthesis and a Proposal for Reform of the Employment At-Will
Doctrine, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 319, 325 (1988).
10 H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
11 See, e.g., Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985) ("The ter-
mination at will doctrine represents a departure from the English common law rule that employ-
ment contracts for indefinite periods were presumed to extend for one year, absent termination for
cause.").
12 See id.
2003]
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can Rule," employers were free to terminate their employees at any time for any
reason:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it
out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by
proof .... An indefinite hiring.., is determinable at the will of
either party.'
3
Conversely, employees were free to leave their employ at any time for any rea-
son.14 The rule of at-will employment was strict in that it allowed an employer
to terminate an employee "for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad
cause."' 5 Because of this rigidity, the at-will employment rule has naturally led
to some harsh applications.
Despite the harshness of the rule, even today some jurisdictions still
hold to the doctrine of at-will employment in a strict sense for several reasons. 7
One reason is the mutual fairness of its provisions - the employer is free to ter-
minate the employee for any reason or no reason, just as the employee is free to
leave his position for any reason or no reason.' 8 Furthermore, any rule forcing
an employee to work after that employee has left his employment would be tan-
13 WOOD, supra note 10, at 272.
14 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) ("[T]he liberty of contract relating to
labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor.").
15 Payne v. W. & Atil. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884) ("[T]he publication of the notice that the
company would discharge employes who traded with plaintiff, was not an unlawful threat nor an
unlawful act; was not a libel; and, though done wickedly and maliciously, and in pursuance of a
wicked design, is still not actionable, because it was not an unlawful act, nor an act done in an
unlawful manner."), overruled on other grounds by, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
16 See, e.g., Clarke v. At. Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1908) (noting that blacks
discharged to make jobs available for whites did not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge
because employment was at-will).
17 See, e.g., Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Bd., 29 P.3d 543, 545 (Okla. 2001)
("The doctrine of employment-at-will is firmly embedded in the common law of Oklahoma. Un-
der this doctrine, an employee with an employment contract of indefinite duration is at liberty to
leave his or her employment for any reason or no reason without incurring liability to the em-
ployer. Notions of fundamental fairness underlie the concept of mutuality which extends a corre-
sponding freedom to the employer. Id. Thus, under the employment-at-will doctrine an employer
is also at liberty to fire an at-will employee for any reason or no reason without incurring liability
to the employee.").
18 An employee can terminate employment even for a reason that could be seen as violative of
public policy. For example, an at-will employee who believed his employer was "too ethical"
would be free to leave his employment and seek employment with a less ethical employer without
the employer being able to seek damages from the employee for resignation in violation of a sub-
stantial public policy. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 3 ("the employee was free to quit and seek
alternate employment whenever he or she wanted, and the employer was free to fire the employee
at any time.").
[Vol. 105
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tamount to "involuntary servitude," resulting in a clearly unconstitutional rule. 19
A second reason is economics--the importance of a free market. The employ-
ment-at-will doctrine encourages both the freedom to contract and the freedom
of employers to make decisions regarding their business in an economically
efficient manner. 20 A third reason is that employment-at-will is a predictable
and easy-to-administer rule.21 Under strict employment-at-will, everyone knows
where he or she stands in the employer-employee relationship. One final and
equally important consideration is the difficulty in defining what constitutes a
substantial public policy to support a public policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine.
Other jurisdictions have kept the notion of employment-at-will, but have
riddled the doctrine with numerous statutory and common-law exceptions which
will be discussed in more detail later in this article.22 Only one jurisdiction,
Montana, has codified its unfair dismissal law to impose a "good cause" re-
quirement for the termination of all non-probationary, non-union, non-civil ser-
vice workers in the state.2 3 Similarly, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") drafted a Model Employment Termi-
nation Act ("Model Act") imposing a similar "just cause" requirement.2 4 So far
no state has adopted the Model Act. 5
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
20 See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 951 (1984) (maintaining that an at-will contract is supported by principles of freedom of
contract and rules of construction).
21 See id.
22 See generally ANDREW D. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 13-14 (1987) (stating that at-will rule has been "riddled with
exceptions and exemptions" and noting that over "two-thirds of American jurisdictions have aban-
doned an absolute employment-at-will rule").
23 See Mark Jarsulic, Protecting Workers from Wrongful Discharge: Montana's Experience
with Tort and Statutory Regimes, 3 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 105 (1999) (discussing Mon-
tana's use of employment termination act). Other states have employee protection acts that limit
the types of actions and amount of damages in retaliatory discharge actions. See, e.g., Marzetta
Jones, The 1996 Arizona Employment Protection Act: A Return to the Employment-at-will Doc-
trine, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1139 (1997).
24 See Jarsulic, supra note 23.
25 See id.
2003]
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III. SOME EXCEPTIONS TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
A. Contract of Employment
The most widely recognized exception to at-will employment occurs
where there is a written contract that specifies a specific duration.26 West Vir-
ginia recognizes this exception where there is an express contract of employ-
ment present between the employer and the employee.27 This contract must
meet all of the requisite elements of contract formation, e.g., offer, acceptance,
consideration.28 Only then will the court look to the provisions of the contract to
see when termination is permissible based on the contractual definition of
"'cause."
B. Judicial Exceptions to At-Will Employment
1. Implied Contract of Employment
Sometimes, even if there is no express contract of employment between
an employer and an employee, courts will find an implied contract of employ-
ment, and thus permit an action for wrongful discharge.29 Under West Virginia
law, if an employer furnishes a complete list of the reasons that would constitute
discharge, such as contained in an employee handbook, this list constitutes
"prima facie evidence of an offer for a unilateral contract of employment modi-
fying the right of the employer to discharge without cause.,, 30 The promise of
job security contained in the employee handbook is deemed to be the offer and
the employee's continuing to work, while under no obligation to do so, is the
acceptance and consideration to the contract. 3' However, merely listing the
causes that may result in termination does not constitute a promise sufficient to
32
create a contract of employment.
To avoid forming an employment contract with an employee, a West
Virginia employer can use a disclaimer33 on the employment application itself or
26 But see Barber v. SMH (US), Inc., 509 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) ("Em-
ployment contracts of indefinite duration are presumed to provide for employment at will.").
27 See Adkins v. Inco Alloys Int'l, 417 S.E.2d 910 (W. Va. 1992); Williamson v. Sharvest
Mgmt. Co., 415 S.E.2d 271 (W. Va. 1992).
28 See id.
29 See, e.g., Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986).
30 Id.
31 Pleasant v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc., 486 S.E.2d 798, 802 (W. Va. 1997) (quoting Cook, 342
S.E. 2d at Syl. Pt. 5).
32 Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, Inc., 426 S.E.2d. 539 (W. Va. 1992).
33 In Lilly v. Overnite Trans. Co., 995 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1993), before basing its ruling on a
Harless public policy claim, the court first looked at whether the employee handbook created an
[Vol. 105
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in the employee handbook.34 Employers should be cautious, however, to state
that a list of factors for which an employee can be terminated is not an exhaus-
tive list and that the disclaimer is conspicuous and the employee has knowledge
of the disclaimer. 35 Courts will often try to find an implied contract of employ-
ment before resorting to a retaliatory discharge claim on the grounds of public
policy.36
2. Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Contract law implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing into con-
tracts.37 The Uniform Commercial Code similarly requires "good faith" in all
contracts for the sale of goods. 38 Some courts have extended the "implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing . . . to limit the employer's ability to fire for
what the courts consider to be a bad faith reason." 39 However, the use of the
good faith and fair dealing doctrine in employment cases in the absence of an
employment contract. The Fourth Circuit found the language of the disclaimer sufficient to keep
the employer from forming a contract with the employee. For the complete disclaimer language
the court found sufficient, see Lilly, 995 F.2d at 523-24.
34 In Mace v. Charleston Area Medical Center Foundation, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va.
1992), the court analyzed the following disclaimer:
Because of court decisions in some states, it has become necessary for us to
make it clear that this handbook is not part of a contract, and no employee of
the Medical Center has any contractual right to the matters set forth in this
handbook. In addition, your employment is subject to termination at any time
either by you or by the medical center .... This handbook is not designed to
be a total departmental manual; therefore, not all rules and regulations are
listed herein.
In view of a provision in the termination section stating that employment was "based on mutual
consent, either the employee or the employer is privileged to terminate employment," the court
held that the plaintiff had no contractual rights as a result of the handbook. Id. In the seminal
case which held that employee handbooks could form a contract of employment, the Michigan
Supreme Court also found that employers could protect themselves by having the employee ac-
knowledge the at-will relationship. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880
(Mich. 1980) (holding a policy manual which stated that the company's policy was to discharge
employees only for just cause sufficient to form a contract of employment).
35 See Mace, 422 S.E.2d at 624.
36 Sometimes courts looked at disclaimer and found no implied contract of employment before
looking at the Harless public policy claims. See Lilly, 995 F.2d 521; Mace, 422 S.E. 2d 624.
.7 See, e.g., Babcock Coal & Coke Co. v. Brackens Creek Coal Land Co., 37 S.E.2d 519, 522
(W. Va. 1946) ("It is of frequent occurrence in the business world that a party to a contract finds
that its performance is onerous and unprofitable; nevertheless, good faith and fair dealing call for
performance.").
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994).
39 Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. Bus.
L.J. 653, 655 (2000).
2003]
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express or implied contract of employment is limited to a few states 40 and has
not been adopted in West Virginia.4 '
C. Statutory Exceptions to At-Will Employment
1. Discrimination
Even if there is no express or implied employment contract, there are
statutory limitations on the ability of an employer to fire an employee for any
reason. For example, many states have enacted statutes that protect employees
from discrimination. In West Virginia, employees are protected from discrimi-
nation on the basis of "race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age,
blindness or disability" 42  by the West Virginia Human Rights Act
("WVHRA.") 43 The WVHRA also prevents an employer from terminating an
employee in retaliation for the filing of a complaint with the West Virginia Hu-
man Rights Commission.44 Additionally, several federal laws prohibit employ-
ment discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196445 provides that
employees cannot be discharged or discriminated against on the basis of race,
40 See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (permitting recovery by
at-will employee under breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing where she was termi-
nated for refusing to date her foreman).
41 See Miller v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that em-
ployee's complaint alleging bad faith breach of employment contract was properly dismissed
because the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not recognized in West Virginia in
the context of at-will employment).
42 "The denial of these rights to properly qualified persons by reason of race, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness, disability or familial status is contrary to the princi-
ples of freedom and equality of opportunity and is destructive to a free and democratic society."
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (2002). Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, an employer must
employ twelve or more persons to be covered under the act. Id. § 5-11-3(d). Under West Virginia
Code section 5-11-3, "employer" is defined as "the state.., and any person employing twelve or
more persons within the state for twenty or more calendar weeks in the calendar year in which the
discrimination took place or the preceding calendar year." But see Williamson v. Greene, 490
S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997) (holding employer who employed less than twelve employees liable due
to Harless claim based on public policy of the West Virginia Human Rights Act).
43 West Virginia Code section 5-11-2 states:
Equal opportunity in the areas of employment ... is hereby declared to be a
human right or civil right of all persons without regard to race, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness or disability.
44 It is an "unlawful discriminatory practice to engage in any form of reprisal or otherwise
discriminate against a person because he or she has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under
[the West Virginia Human Rights Act] or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or
assisted in any proceeding" allowed by the West Virginia Human Rights Act. W. VA. CODE § 5-
11 -9(7)(C) (2000).
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
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color, religion, sex, or national origin.46 Persons with disabilities are protected
from discriminatory discharge under the Americans with Disabilities Act with
protections similar to those given on the basis of race, age, sex, etc.47
Other federal laws protect specific categories of employees. For in-
stance, persons over 40 are protected under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
48ment Act. Pregnant women are also protected from discharge due to their
pregnancy under an amendment to Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978. 49 Under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, reinstatement after
leave is guaranteed to employees who meet certain criteria.5° Many of these
acts also prohibit discharge by a private employer in retaliation for invoking the
rights provided under the act.5'
2. Whistleblower Statutes
Some states, including West Virginia, have general "whistleblower"
statutes that protect public employees from termination in retaliation for blow-
ing the whistle on employer misconduct.52 West Virginia Code section 6C-1-3
states that no public employer may discharge or discriminate against an em-
ployee who has made a good faith report about instances of wrongdoing 53 or
waste.54 This statute is only applicable to employees of the State, and not to
private employees.55 However, there are other "whistleblower" statutes in West
Virginia and under federal law that prohibit retaliatory termination by private
46 Id.
47 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). See generally S. Elizabeth Wilbom Malloy, Something Bor-
rowed, Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603 (2001).
48 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000). See generally Tracy Karen Finkelstein, Judicial and Adminis-
trative Interpretations of the BFOQ as Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 40
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217 (1992) (overview of the ADEA, its history, and the bona fide occupational
qualification defense).
49 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). See generally Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant With Possibil-
ity: Reexamining the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 819 (2001).
50 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000). See generally G. John Tysse and Kimberly L. Japinga, The Fed-
eral Family and Medical Leave Act; Easily Conceived, Difficult Birth, Enigmatic Child, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 361 (1994).
51 See infra notes 59-64.
52 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 6C-1-1 to -8 (2000).
53 Wrongdoing is defined as "a violation which is not merely technical or minimal nature of a
federal or state statute or regulation, of a political subdivision ordinance or of a code of conduct or
ethics designed to protect the interest of the public or the employer." Id. § 6C-1 -2(f).
54 Waste is defined as "an employer or employee's conduct or omissions which result in sub-
stantial abuse, misuse, destruction or loss of funds or resources belonging to or derived from fed-
eral, state or political subdivision sources." Id.
55 See id. §§ 6C-1-2 to -3.
2003]
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employers against private employees. These include the retaliatory discharge
provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act,56 Mine Safety Act,57 Mine Safety
and Health Act,5 8 Equal Pay for Equal Work Act,59 Occupational Safety and
Health Act,60 Labor Management Relations Act,61 Employee Retirement Income
Security Act,62 Energy Reorganization Act,63 Clean Air Act,
64 Bankruptcy Act,65
Consumer Credit Protection Act,66 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act,67 Toxic
Substances Control Act, 68 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act,69 Safe Drinking Water Act,70 Water Pollution Control
Act, 71 Solid Waste Disposal Act,72 Energy Reorganization Act,73 and the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.74 These statutory provisions involve re-
taliatory discharge for persons reporting violations of these particular acts or
exercising rights under them.
D. Retaliatory Discharge Based on Public Policy
"The most widely-adopted common law exception to the at-will doc-
trine imposes liability on an employer who discharges a worker for reasons that
contravene a substantial public policy. '75 Petermann v. International Brother-
56 Id. §§ 23-5A-1 to -3.
57 Id. § 22A- 1-22.
58 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1977).
59 W. VA. CODE § 21-5B-3 (2002).
60 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2000); W. VA. CODE § 21-3A-13(a) (2002).
61 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2000).
62 Id. §§ 1140-1141.
63 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000).
64 Id. § 7622.
65 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2000).
66 15 U.S.C. § 674 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-131 (1999).
67 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 61-5-25(a) (2000).
68 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000).
69 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2000).
70 Id. § 300j-9(i).
71 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
72 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000).
73 Id. § 5851.
74 30 U.S.C. § 1293 (2000).
75 Bastress, supra note 9, at 326; see also Ballam, supra note 39, at 656 ("The most significant
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hood of Teamsters76 is considered the seminal case on the public policy excep-
tion to the at-will employment doctrine. 77 In Petermann, the plaintiff at-will
employee was subpoenaed to testify before a state legislative committee. 78 Dis-
regarding the employer's instructions to falsely testify, the plaintiff testified
truthfully at the hearing and was discharged upon his return to work.79 The Pe-
termann court held that it is "obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary
to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any em-
ployee, whether the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on
the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically
,,80enjoined by statute.
The rationale behind the public policy exception comes from the recog-
nition of the unequal bargaining power present in the employer-employee rela-
tionship and the dependence of employees on their jobs:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent
upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people
have become completely dependent upon wages . . . . Such de-
pendence of the mass of people upon others for all of their in-
come is something new in this world. For our generation, the
substance of life is in another man's hands.
81
Given the dependence of employees on their employers for their livelihood, and
the freedom given the employer by the employment-at-will doctrine, there is
potential for abuse by employers, resulting in great economic, social and emo-
tional losses to the discharged employee. The public policy exception was
limitation on the employment-at-will doctrine has arisen from tort law with a cause of action for
wrongful discharge based on public policy claims.").
76 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959).
77 See Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 595, 598 n.4 (W. Va. 2000).
78 Petermann, 344 P.2d at 26.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 27.
81 FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951), cited in Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individiual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); see also J. Noble Braden, From Conflict to Coopera-
tion, Sixth Annual Labor Relations Conference 43 (Inst. of Indus. Rel., W. Va. Univ., 1956)
("There was a time when a worker's job was a thing of the hour; he could be hired or fired at will,
and his only right was to be paid for the hour he worked. Today, the job has become a thing of
value . . . the worker has come to have what might be called a property right in his job. His
wages and benefits generally accrue with seniority, which increases the value of his job as time
goes on .... Like any other property holder in our free, democratic society, he cannot be deprived
of his rights except by due process.").
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viewed as a way to curb the potential for abuse resulting from the employment
at-will doctrine.
IV. THE HARLESS SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
A. Holding of Harless I
The West Virginia substantial public policy exception to at-will em-
ployment was created in Harless v. First National Bank.82 In Harless I, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that:
the rule that an employer has an absolute right to discharge an
at-will employee must be tempered by the principle that where
the employer's motivation for the discharge is to contravene
some substantial public policy principle, then the employer may
be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by this dis-
charge. 83
B. Facts of Harless I
John Harless was the manager of a bank's consumer credit depart-
ment.84 He alleged that the bank "had intentionally and illegally overcharged
customers on prepayment of their installment loans and intentionally did not
make proper rebates. 85 He further alleged that he had been terminated because
he tried to get the bank to comply with certain consumer credit laws, including
provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act.86 The
circuit court dismissed both counts of his complaint 87 for failure to state a cause
of action and certified the question of whether such a cause of action existed in
West Virginia to the West Virginia Supreme Court.88 The West Virginia Su-
82 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 272.
85 Id.
86 Id. The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act is found in West Virginia Code
sections 46A-1-101 to 8-102. See also Vincent Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 401 (1975).
87 The first count was that he had been terminated for trying to get the bank to comply with
consumer credit laws. The second count was that the bank's conduct was "intentional, malicious
and outrageous conduct which caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress." Harless I, 246
S.E.2d at 273.
88 Id.
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preme Court reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that the plaintiffs
complaint did state a cause of action.89
C. Reasoning of the Court
The supreme court began its discussion in Harless I by recognizing that
West Virginia is an at-will employment jurisdiction. 90 The court held that it is an
"established rule" if there is no fixed term of employment, that the employment
is "terminable at the will of either party, with or without cause." 9' Then the
court recognized the "growing trend that ... an employer may subject himself
to liability if he fires an employee who is employed at will if the employee can
show that the firing was motivated by an intention to contravene some substan-
tial public policy. '92 The court looked at numerous cases from other jurisdic-
tions including Oregon,93 Pennsylvania,94 Indiana, 95 Michigan,96 Idaho,97 Ari-
zona,98 Washington,99 New Hampshire,1°° Massachusetts,10 1 and California.
10 2
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. (citing Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 90 S.E.2d 459, 468 (W. Va. 1955);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)).
92 Id. at 273.
93 Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (finding substantial public policy to support wrong-
ful discharge where employee was fired for performing jury duty); Campbell v. Ford Industries,
546 P.2d 141 (Or. 1976) (refusing to sustain a cause of action for wrongful discharge when em-
ployee was fired for exercising his fight to examine his corporations books because there is no
substantial public policy in this right, only a private protection for stockholders).
94 Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974) (refusing to find a cause
of action for wrongful discharge where employee was allegedly fired for complaints about the
safety of a pipe manufactured by his employer). The court in Geary did not fully reject a cause of
action for wrongful discharge based on substantial public policy, but only chose not to adopt it in
this case. Id.
95 Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (finding substantial pub-
lic policy in Indiana's workers' compensation laws).
96 Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. 1976) (finding substantial public policy in
Michigan's workers' compensation laws).
97 Jackson v. Minidoka, 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977) (recognizing a general exception for dis-
charge that contravenes public policy, but declining to apply it to the facts of the case).
98 Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. 1977) (recognizing a general exception for
discharge that contravenes public policy, but declining to apply it to two employees allegedly
discharged for refusing to take lie detector tests).
99 Roberts v At. Richfield Co., 568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977) (discussing the doctrine, but de-
clining to decide whether to adopt it).
100 Monge v. Bebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (female employee fired for refusing
to go out with her foreman) (holding that "a termination by the employer of a contract of employ-
ment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best
2003]
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The court also observed that "some suggestion of the applicability of equitable
principles to the general rule against employer liability for the discharge of an
at-will employee" could be found in earlier West Virginia cases. 0 3 After ana-
lyzing these cases, the court acknowledged that this was a case of first impres-
sion for the West Virginia Supreme Court,1°4 and decided to adopt an exception
to the absolute right to discharge an employee "where the employer's motiva-
tion for the discharge contravenes some substantial public policy principle."'
0 5
After adopting the rule, the court then applied it to the facts to determine
whether Harless' discharge contravened a substantial public policy in the state
of West Virginia. The court recognized that the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act "represents a comprehensive attempt on the part of the Leg-
islature to extend protection to the consumers and persons who obtain credit in
this State and who obviously constitute the vast majority of our adult citi-
zens,"' 10 6 and that the "Legislature intended to establish a clear and unequivocal
public policy that consumers of credit covered by the Act were to be given pro-
tection. ' ' 7 The court reasoned that to allow an employee like Harless to be
fired for trying to get the bank to comply with the Act would frustrate this pur-
pose, and it concluded that Harless had stated a cause of action for his dis-
charge. 0 8 Finally, the court concluded that Harless could state a cause of action
and recover damages for his emotional injury due to his employer's conduct.' °9
interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract").
101 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (holding that firing
of salesman to keep him from getting sales commissions was in "bad faith" and violated the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all employment contracts).
102 Schweiger v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 476 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1970) (authorizing
retaliatory eviction saying "one may not exercise normally unrestricted power if his reasons for its
exercise contravene public policy"); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793
(1961) (finding a cause of action for wrongful discharge against an employer who discharged
employees because they had applied for membership to a union); Petermann v. Int'l Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959) (holding employer liable for discharge of employee when
he refused to testify falsely before a legislative committee).
103 Harless I, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978) (referring to Chicago Towel Co. v. Reynolds,
152 S.E. 200 (W. Va. 1930)).
104 Id. at 275. The court considered Harless a case of first impression despite the court's hold-
ing in Chicago Towel Co. v. Reynolds, finding inequitable discharge of an at-will employee when
the discharge occurred "without notice and without excuse or attempted justification for its ac-
tion." 152 S.E. 200 (W. Va. 1930).
105 Harless I, 246 S.E.2d at 275.
106 Id. at 275-76.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 276.
109 Id.
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D. Damages
After answering the certified question in Harless I, and holding that
there was a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on substantial public
policy, Harless I," ° the sequel, made it back to the West Virginia Supreme
Court for consideration of the correctness of damages awarded to Harless by the
trial court. Because the sole question in Harless I was whether a cause of action
existed in West Virginia for wrongful discharge based on substantial public pol-
icy, the court never reached the question of damages in the case."' However, in
a footnote to Harless I, the court stated the cause of action "is one in tort and it
therefore follows that the rules relating to tort damages would be applicable."
'
" 
2
On remand, the jury awarded Harless $62,500 in compensatory dam-
ages and $62,500 in punitive damages. 1 3 The trial court judge reduced a por-
tion of the damages, and both parties appealed.' "4 In Harless II, after acknowl-
edging that Harless claims were actions in tort, 15 the court discussed the avail-
ability of personal liability in a Harless claim and decided that an agent of the
employer can be liable for damages in a Harless action.' 6 The court then de-
cided that because a Harless claim is a tort action, tort damage law is applica-
ble. 1
7
Under West Virginia tort law, damages for emotional distress are avail-
able for an intentional act without the presence of a physical injury." 8 How-
ever, whether damages were available for emotional distress resulting from a
nonphysical injury in a retaliatory discharge case was not as clear when Harless
I was decided.1 9 Finding that the tort of retaliatory discharge "carries with it a
sufficient indicia of intent," the court in Harless II held that "damages for emo-
110 Harless v. First Nat'i Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982) [hereinafter Harless II].
III See Harless I, 246 S.E.2d at 270.
112 Id. at 275 n.5.
113 Harless II, 289 S.E.2d at 695.
114 Id.
115 In the time between Harless I and Harless II, the court decided several cases based on a
Harless theory. See, e.g., Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1981); Shanholtz v.
Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980).
116 Harless II, 289 S.E.2d at 699.
117 ld. at 701.
118 See id.; see also Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 36 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1945)
(damages available in tort where "there was no impact and no physical injury caused by the de-
fendant's wrong, but an emotional or mental disturbance is shown to have been the result of the
defendant's intentional or wanton wrongful act. In any of the foregoing classifications we believe
that the plain weight of authority sustains a recovery.").
119 See Harless II, 289 S.E.2d at 702 ("In this area courts are more reluctant to permit recovery
for emotional distress .... ).
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tional distress may be recovered as a part of compensatory damages." 120 The
court itself recognized the holding gave the jury "a rather open-hand in the as-
sessment of damages."'
121
Next, the court in Harless II discussed the issue of whether punitive
damages are available in a Harless cause of action for wrongful discharge.
122
The court held that:
Because there is a certain open-endedness in the limits of re-
covery for emotional distress in a retaliatory discharge claim,
we decline to automatically allow a claim for punitive damages
to be added to the damage picture. We do recognize that where
the employer's conduct is wanton, willful or malicious, punitive
damages may be appropriate.1
23
In West Virginia, punitive damages are allowed to punish the defendant for
"willfulness, wantonness, malice, or other like aggravation of his wrong to the
plaintiff, over and above full compensation for all injuries directly or indirectly
resulting from such wrong."' 124 After analyzing the facts underlying Harless'
discharge, the court found that punitive damages were not appropriate in his
case because sufficient evidence of egregious conduct beyond his retaliatory
discharge was not present.1
25
However, in a footnote the court hinted that punitive damages might be
appropriate in a Harless action where an employer circulates false rumors about
the employee or interferes with the employee's attempts to find a new job. 126
Finally, the court discussed Harless's claim for outrageous conduct and found
the claim duplicative of the emotional distress component of the retaliatory dis-
charge claim.127 To allow Harless to recover on both claims would be to allow
him a double recovery, and double recovery for a single injury is not allowed
under West Virginia tort law. 1
28
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 703.
123 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
124 Syl. Pt. 1, O'Brien v. Snodgrass, 16 S.E.2d 621 (W. Va. 1941).
125 Harless II, 289 S.E.2d at 703 (noting that "[tihe plaintiff must prove further egregious
conduct on the part of the employer" to recover punitive damages, in other words, more than just
the act of retaliatory discharge).
126 Id. at 703 n.19.
127 Id. at 705.
128 Id. (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages § 3 (1966) ("It is generally recognized that there can be
only one recovery of damages for one wrong or injury. Double recovery of damages is not permit-
ted; the law does not permit a double satisfaction for a single injury. A plaintiff may not recover
[Vol. 105
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V. HARLESS'S PROGENY
A. Defining Substantial Public Policy
Although the supreme court's holding in Harless I made it clear that
West Virginia recognizes at-will employment but will prohibit termination that
contravenes substantial public policy, what constitutes a substantial public pol-
icy sufficient to overcome the at-will relationship is difficult to define . 29 Defin-
ing what does or does not constitute public policy has been referred to by at
least one court as "the Achilles heel" of the public policy wrongful discharge
tort. 130 The West Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that public policy "is
sometimes defined as that principle of law under which freedom of contract or
private dealings are restricted by law for the good of the community--the public
good."'131 Public policy has also been defined by the West Virginia Supreme
Court as "that principle of law which holds that no person can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public good even
though no actual injury may have resulted therefrom in a particular case to the
public."'
132
By its very definition of the cause of action as one based on a termina-
tion that contravenes a "substantial public policy," the holding in Harless I dic-
tates that the public policy must be "substantial." The West Virginia Supreme
Court has specifically acknowledged that the term "'substantial public policy'
implies that the policy principle will be clearly recognized simply because it is
substantial."'' 33 Further, in order to be substantial the policy "must not just be
recognizable as such but must be so widely regarded as to be evident to employ-
ers and employees alike."'134 The policy must "provide specific guidance to a
damages twice for the same injury simply because he has two legal theories .... ).
129 See, e.g., Wounaris v. West Virginia State College, 588 S.E.2d 406, 413 (W.Va. 2003) (per
curiam) ("The Court has sometimes struggled with just what constitutes a substantial public policy
issue that would prevent an at-will employee from being fired."); Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc.,
541 S.E.2d 616, 619 (W. Va. 2000) (quoting Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va.
1985)). For an earlier definition of public policy by the West Virginia Supreme Court, see Cordle
v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (W. Va. 1984) ("The rule of law, most gen-
erally stated, is that 'public policy' is that principle of law which holds that 'no person can law-
fully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public good even though
,no actual injury' may have resulted therefrom in a particular case 'to the public."') (quoting Allen
v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. 37 A.2d 37, 39 (N.J. 1944)).
130 Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I11. 1981).
131 Kanagy, 541 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Higgins v. McFarland, 86 S.E.2d 168, 172 (Va. 1955)).
132 Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W. Va. 2001) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
133 Id. at 718 (quoting Birthisiel v. Tri-Cities Health Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va.
1992)).
134 Id.
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reasonable person,"'' 35 however whether something is a "substantial public pol-
icy" that would support an exception to at-will employment is a question of
law. 136 One limitation is that the policy cannot be so broad or vague that it
would not provide specific guidance to a reasonable person. 137
B. Sources of Public Policy Recognized in West Virginia
After defining "substantial public policy," the next step is to determine
the allowable sources of that policy. In Birthisiel v. Tri-Cities Health Services
Corporation,'38 the court held that "[t]o identify the sources of public policy for
purposes of determining whether a retaliatory discharge has occurred, we look
to established precepts in our constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively
approved regulations, and judicial opinions.' 39 Other West Virginia cases have
found or have declined to find substantial public policy based on all of the
Birthisiel sources: 1) the constitution,"40 2) statutes,"4 1 3) administrative regula-
tions, 142 and 4) judicial opinions. 43
Some cases seem to find substantial public policy exceptions in a fifth
unexplained category - "other." 144 These cases may be somewhat analogous to
the broad language from Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corporation45 that
public policy can be found in "the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the fed-
eral and state governments relating to and affecting the safety, health, morals
135 Birthisel, 424 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 3.
136 Syl. Pt. 1, Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984).
137 Birthisel, 424 S.E.2d at 612-13 ("Neither of these provisions contain [sic] any specific guid-
ance. Their general admonitions as to the requirement of good care for patients by social workers
do not constitute the type of substantial and clear public policy on which a retaliatory discharge
claim can be based. If such a general standard could constitute a substantial public policy, it would
enable a social worker to make a challenge to any type of procedure that the worker felt violated
his or her sense of good service.").
138 424 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1992).
139 Id. at 612.
140 See, e.g., Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1998).
141 See, e.g., Lilly v. Overnight Transp. Co., 425 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1992) (finding substantial
public policy in motor vehicle safety statutes and regulations).
142 See, e.g., Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2000) (finding a substantial
public policy in the administrative regulations of barbers and cosmetologists in West Virginia).
143 See, e.g., Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001) (finding a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge based on the common law right to defend oneself in the face of
imminent lethal danger).
144 See, e.g., Williamson v. Greene, 490 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997).
145 325 S.E.2d I 1l (W. Va. 1984).
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and general welfare of the people. ,,146 In Cordle, the court held that an em-
ployee's discharge for refusing to take a polygraph test gave rise to a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge.147 The court took a broad view of public policy,
as evidenced by its use of nebulous terms in its definition of public policy such
as "acknowledged prevailing concepts" and "relating to and affecting the safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of the people." By using these terms the
court did not restrict itself to constitutional provisions, legislative enactments, or
even administrative regulations or common law. This definition allows for an
"other" category of conduct - conduct constituting a substantial public policy
interest of the state of West Virginia because it is an "acknowledged prevailing
concept" relating to the "safety, health, morals, or general welfare of the people"
even if not in any case law, legislative enactments, or in the Constitution.
Most recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court has laid out a list of
four factors "particularly instructive" to a determination of whether a discharge
has been in contravention of a substantial public policy.148 First, the court
should determine whether a "clear public policy existed and was manifested in a
state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the com-
mon law (the clarity element)."' 149 Second, the court should analyze whether
"dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff's
dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element)."' 150 Third,
the court should determine whether the "plaintiffs dismissal was motivated by
conduct related to the public policy (the causation element)."' 151 Finally, the
court should consider whether the "employer lacked overriding legitimate busi-
ness justification for the dismissal (the overriding justification element)."' 52
These factors, specifically the first factor, may be helpful in determining
what constitutes substantial public policy, and narrowing substantial public poli-
cies to those found in the state or federal constitution, statute, administrative
regulation, or common law. However, these factors, although "instructive" to a
determination of the employee's cause of action, are not law, and the court is not
bound by the parameters of the factors in its determination. Further, the factors
have not been applied to any subsequent cases as of the date of this article and
their true impact remains to be seen. Adopting the first factor, ironically the
''clarity element," as a definition of "substantial public policy" in West Virginia
and narrowly construing it, would restrict the scope of the public policy excep-
tion in West Virginia, provide guidance to employers and employees as well as
146 Id. at 114 (quoting Allen v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 37 A.2d 37 (N.J. 1944)).
147 Id. at 117.
148 Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 723.
149 Id. at 723 (quoting Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 1999)).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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the courts, and generally clarify the law in this area. The following sections will
survey West Virginia Harless wrongful discharge cases in an attempt to deter-
mine what constitutes "substantial public policy" in the state of West Virginia.
1. Substantial Public Policy Based on the West Virginia and
United States Constitutions
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been reluctant in the
case of a private employee to find a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
based on a public policy emanating from the West Virginia or the United States
Constitution. The West Virginia Supreme Court has found actionable retaliatory
discharge where a public employer discharged an employee in retaliation for
exercise of the employee's state constitutional rights to petition for redress of
grievances where the employee sought access to the courts by filing an action
for overtime wages. 153 However, the court has been reluctant to find substantial
public policy based on constitutional provisions in the case of a private em-
ployee where there is no statute expressly applying a particular constitutional
provision to the private employee.
154
For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court determined, as a matter
of first impression, that an employee did not have a public policy wrongful dis-
charge cause of action against a private employer emanating from the free
speech clause of the state constitution. 155 In Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical
156Center, Inc., an employee who was discharged for exercising her constitu-
tional right to free speech brought a cause of action against her employer for
wrongful discharge. 57 The court held that whether a public policy exists against
a private employer emanating from the state constitution must be done on a case
by case basis, and that the Free Speech clause is not applicable to a private sec-
tor employee. 58 If there had been a statute "expressly imposing public policy
emanating from the State constitutional Free Speech Clause upon private sector
employees," the employee probably would have been able to maintain a Harless
claim for wrongful discharge.1
59
153 Syl. Pt. 3, McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 360 S.E.2d 221 (W. Va. 1987) (citing W.
VA. CONST. art. III, §§ 16, 17; W. VA. CODE § 21-5C-8 (1975)).
154 See, e.g., Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1998).
155 Id.
156 506 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1998).
157 Id.
158 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 ("Determining whether a state constitutional provision may be applied to a
private sector employer must be done on a case-by-case basis, i.e., through selective incorporation
and application.").
159 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 ("The Free Speech Clause of the state constitution is not applicable to a
private sector employer. In the absence of a statute expressly imposing public policy emanating
from the state constitutional Free Speech Clause upon private sector employers, an employee does
[Vol. 105
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2. Substantial Public Policy Based on Federal and State Statutes
In contrast to West Virginia's reluctance to finding a substantial public
policy based on constitutional rights, the West Virginia Supreme Court has read-
ily allowed wrongful discharge causes of action and found substantial public
policy in various legislative enactments. For example, an employee who was
denied employment on the sole basis that he received services for mental illness,
mental retardation, or addiction was found to state a cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge because the employer's conduct violated West Virginia Code sec-
tion 27-5-9(a). 60 Prior to the enactment of a specific retaliatory discharge pro-
vision within the West Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act,' 61 the court also
recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge where an employer termi-
nated an employee because the employee filed a worker's compensation claim
against the employer in violation of the retaliation provision of the Worker's
Compensation Act.162  In addition, the court recognized a cause of action for
wrongful discharge where an employer fired an employee for his efforts to en-
sure that his employer complied with federal and state mine safety laws and for
his refusal to operate unsafe equipment despite the fact that the employee did
not exercise his statutory remedies under the antidiscrimination provisions of
both federal and state mining laws. 163  The West Virginia Supreme Court fur-
ther recognized a Harless claim under the West Virginia Mine Safety Act where
an employee was discharged for refusing to falsify safety reports concerning a
safety inspection at the employer's plant.164 Finally, an employee stated a cause
of action for wrongful discharge where the employer discharged him in retalia-
tion for exercising rights under the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act. 165
not have a cause of action against a private sector employer who terminates the employee because
of the exercise of the employee's state constitutional right of free speech.").
160 Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980) (certified question) (statute
providing that no person shall be deprived of any civil rights solely by reason of his receipt of
services for mental illness created implied private cause of action against private employer who
allegedly denied employment to otherwise qualified individual on sole basis that such individual
had received services for mental illness, mental retardation or addiction); see also W. VA. CODE §
27-5-9(a) ("No person shall be deprived of any civil right solely by reason of his receipt of ser-
vices for mental illness, mental retardation or addiction, nor shall the receipt of such services
modify or vary any civil right of such person ......
161 W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3.
162 Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980) (Harless claim based
on termination in retaliation of filing a workers' compensation claim).
163 Wiggins v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 357 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1987).
164 Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1988); see also W. VA. CODE §§ 22A-
IA-I to -35 (1988), repealed by 1994 W. Va. Acts c. 61 (current version at W. VA. CODE §§
22A-2-1 to -79 (2000)).
165 Mace v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr. Found., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va. 1992); see also 38
U.S.C. §§ 2021-2066 (2000).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court has also found substantial public pol-
icy in several state and federal statutes despite the absence of retaliatory dis-
charge provisions within those statutes. For instance, statutes regulating the
safety of brakes, making it a misdemeanor to drive an unsafe vehicle, and pro-
viding for the promulgation of safety rules and regulations applicable to motor
vehicles were the basis of a cause of action for wrongful discharge where an
employee was fired for refusing to operate a motor vehicle with unsafe
brakes.166 After this answer by the West Virginia Supreme Court to a certified
question,167 the Fourth Circuit held that the discharge of a driver for refusing to
drive a delivery truck with defective brakes would violate a substantial West
Virginia public policy as codified in West Virginia Code sections 17C-15-1(a),
17C-15-31, and 24A-5-5(j). 168
A wrongful discharge cause of action was also found to exist under
West Virginia Code section 21-5-5, which prohibits an employer from coercing
an employee to purchase goods in payment of wages due him. 69 In Roberts v.
Adkins, an employee who worked for an oil company, where his employer also
owned an automobile dealership, was allegedly fired for purchasing a vehicle
from a competitor's automobile dealership.170 The court held that where the
employee did not work for the employer's automobile dealership, and where the
purchased goods were in no way related to or within the scope of his employ-
ment, there was a cause of action for wrongful discharge.
17 1
The Roberts court reasoned that section 21-5-5 prohibits not only coerc-
ing an employee to purchase goods from a "company store," but also "that the
legislature also intended to eliminate and to prevent employment practices
where the employee was being coerced or compelled to purchase goods under
other circumstances utilized by the employer, for instance the threat of losing, or
actual loss of the employee's job."'' 72 The court further reasoned that the pur-
pose of the legislation was to "eliminate the employer practices of forcing em-
ployees to purchase goods at companies owned by the employer but which had
nothing to do with the employees' employment."
1 73
166 Lilly v. Overnight Transp. Co., 425 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1992) (answering certified question
at to whether a public policy existed in W. VA. CODE §§ 17C-15-1(a) (1991), 17C-15-31 (1991),
24A-5-5(j) (1992)).
167 See id.
168 Lilly v. Overnite Transp. Co., 995 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1993).
169 See W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5 (2002); Roberts v. Adkins, 444 S.E.2d 725 (W. Va. 1994).
170 Roberts, 444 S.E.2d at 725.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 729.
173 Id.
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Despite its holding in Roberts, the court voiced its intention not to
"unlock a Pandora's box of litigation in the wrongful discharge arena."' 74 To
help keep the "Pandora's box" from opening all the way, there have been cases
declining to find public policy in a federal or state statute. For example, a sub-
stantial public policy will not be found where a statute is designed only to pro-
tect a narrow class of citizens, e.g., insurance agents, rather than a broad societal
interest.175 In Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,176 an insurance agent tried to
bring a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under West Virginia Code sec-
tion 33-12A-1 et seq., relating to the contract between insurance agents and in-
surance companies. 177 The agent alleged that he had been terminated for object-
ing to his employer's illegal use of client funds to finance new insurance poli-
cies. 78 The Shell court held that where a statute is only designed to protect one
specific group and not a broad societal interest, it does not consist of substantial
public policy that will justify state interference with the private contractual obli-
gation of the parties. 179 Public policy must protect the public in general, not a
small group of individuals.
Sometimes Harless claims brought under the same act can bring forth
conflicting results. For example, an employee's discharge for attempting to
enforce rights granted by West Virginia's Consumer Credit and Protection Act
for protection of all consumers has been held to be a violation of substantial
public policy that may give rise to retaliatory discharge claim. 180 However,
where a retaliatory discharge claim is based upon the assertion by the plaintiff
that he was terminated due to his attempt to enforce warranty rights granted him
pursuant to the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act,' 81 the plain-
174 ld. at 719.
175 See Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 1990) (answering certified
question finding no substantial public policy in W. VA. CODE §§ 33-12A-1 to -5 (1984).
176 380 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 1990).
177 Id. West Virginia Code section 33-12A-1 provides that:
[i]t is hereby found and determined by the legislature that it is essential to the
best interests of the citizens of this State that the contractual relationship be-
tween insurance agents and insurance companies be established; and that this
article is enacted for the purpose of prohibiting arbitrary and capricious can-
cellation of such contractual relationships.
178 Shell, 380 S.E.2d at 187.
179 See id. at 191 (questioning whether W. VA. CODE §§ 33-12A-1 to -5 "strikes an appropriate
balance between the reasonable exercise of the State's police powers and legislation that simply
benefits a special interest group ....")_
180 See Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 426 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1992). Harless I was also
brought under the Consumer Credit and Protection Act.
181 W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6-101 to -107 (2000).
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tiff had no basis for such a claim unless he could demonstrate that a valid war-
ranty was created at the time of the sale of the goods.
82
When the Fourth Circuit has been asked to find public policy based on a
West Virginia Code provision when the West Virginia Supreme Court had not
yet addressed whether there is a substantial public policy inherent in that statute,
it has exercised judicial restraint because the issue has not yet been decided in
West Virginia. Further, the Fourth Circuit has also recognized the importance
of deference to the West Virginia legislature, stating that "[tihe power to declare
an employer's conduct as contrary to public policy is to be exercised with re-
straint, and with due deference to the West Virginia legislature as the primary
organ of public policy in the state."'' 83 For example, in Tritle v. Crown Airways,
Inc.,' 84 two West Virginia statutes regulating airplane safety were not held to
support a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on public policy be-
cause the West Virginia Supreme Court had not yet addressed the question
whether West Virginia Code sections 29-2A-12 and 29-2A-20, relating to air-
plane safety, supported a Harless cause of action.1
85
The Fourth Circuit stated in Washington v. Union Carbide Corpora-
tion 186 that "West Virginia courts have proceeded with 'great caution' in apply-
ing public policy to wrongful discharge actions .... Prior cases in this area
underscore the need for retaliatory discharge actions to rest upon a statutory
articulation of public policy by the West Virginia legislature."' 87 In Washing-
ton, the Fourth Circuit found no retaliatory discharge by a private employee
under West Virginia's Occupation Safety and Health Act,188 which applied only
to public employees, because no statutory recognition of an action for retaliatory
discharge for reporting safety violations had been generally conferred in West
Virginia. 89 In both Tritle and Washington, the Fourth Circuit stated that these
questions would not be answered in the absence of West Virginia precedent,
182 Reed, 426 S.E.2d at 539.
183 Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1989).
184 928 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (refusing to find a substantial public policy creat-
ing a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under W. VA. CODE §§ 29-2A-20 and 29-2A-12
(1986) because the West Virginia courts had not yet recognized it).
185 See id.
186 870 F.2d 957, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1989).
187 Id. The court went on to state that "[tlhere is no instance in which the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals has recognized a retaliatory discharge action of any sort in the absence of
legislative recognition that such discharge contravenes the public policy of the state." Id. at 963.
But see Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606. 611 (W. Va. 1992) ("Most
of our retaliatory discharge cases involve violations of statutes that we deem to articulate a sub-
stantial public policy.") (emphasis added).
188 W. VA. CODE § 21-3A-13 (2002).
189 Washington, 870 F.2d at 957.
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giving due deference to the West Virginia legislature.190 Conversely, the West
Virginia Supreme Court only seems to exercise judicial restraint in creating pub-
lic policy exceptions based on statutes in a few instances - specifically, (1)
where the statute protects individuals and not the public and (2) where there is a
conflict between a collective bargaining agreement and a Harless action. In the
latter instance, the court is reluctant to undermine the policy behind collective
bargaining and punish an employer for adhering to the provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. For example, although it violates public policy to
discharge an employee for filing a worker's compensation claim,19' there was no
retaliatory discharge claim stated by an employee who was off work on work-
ers' compensation, but who was discharged pursuant to a collective bargaining
provision that mandated termination of an employee who is unavailable for
work during a twelve-month period.
192
3. Substantial Public Policy Based on the Common Law
Turning to the issue of when the West Virginia Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a substantial public policy based on the common law, sometimes it is
difficult to identify whether a substantial public policy in West Virginia is based
on common law or arises from the Constitution. For example, cases based upon
an employee's right to privacy appear to be based on a common law right of
privacy, not on constitutional rights, but in some jurisdictions similar cases arise
under the Constitution. 193 In West Virginia, several cases have found a substan-
tial public policy in an individual's right to privacy sufficient to support a
Harless-type claim. 194 In West Virginia, it is contrary to the public policy in
favor of an individual's common law right to privacy for an employer to require
or request an employee to submit to a polygraph test or similar test as a condi-
tion of employment.195 Similarly, it is also contrary to public policy for an em-
ployer to require employee drug testing unless the testing is based upon reason-
able suspicion or the employee's job involves public safety.196
19o See Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1990) (this case is one of the
drawbacks of federal diversity jurisdiction).
191 Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1991) (Harless claim based
on W. VA. CODE§§ 23-5A-I to -4).
192 Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
193 See Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d I l I (W. Va. 1984); Twigg v. Hercu-
les Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1990).
194 See Cordle, 325 S.E.2d at I I (polygraph test); Twigg, 406 S.E.2d 52 (drug test).
195 Cordle, 325 S.E.2d at I ll. West Virginia now has legislation that prohibits most employ-
ers from requiring or requesting that an employee submit to a polygraph test. W. VA. CODE § 21-
5-5b (2002).
196 Twigg, 406 S.E.2d 52 (holding that while drug testing by an employer would generally
violate public policy in West Virginia, it is not an intrusion into a person's right to privacy, where
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Also, in West Virginia it is against substantial public policy to discharge
an at-will employee because the employee has given or may be called to give
truthful testimony in legal action. 197 In Page v. Columbia Natural Resources,
Inc., 198 the trial court found that there existed a public policy in favor of the
right to testify, and that the employer's discharge of an employee who testified
in a deposition, taken in an unrelated lawsuit against the employer, gave rise to a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of that public policy.
Recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court held in Feliciano v. 7-
Eleven, Inc.,199 that "when an at will employee has been discharged from his/her
employment based upon his/her exercise of self-defense in response to lethal
imminent danger, such right of self-defense constitutes a substantial public pol-
icy exception to the at will employment doctrine and will sustain a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful discharge., 200 In Feliciano, a convenience store employee
thwarted a robbery attempt in violation of the store's safety policy prohibiting
employees from trying to subvert robbery attempts. 20  The employee was then
discharged for violating the store's policies, and sued his employer for retalia-
tory discharge.20 2
In determining the source for the substantial public policy in Feliciano,
the court first looked to the Constitution and legislation of West Virginia.0 3
Finding these sources inadequate, the court found a clear existence of the right
to defend oneself in the jurisprudence of the state. 204 After weighing the sub-
stantial public policy of self-defense against the dangers of self-defense in this
context, the court found that there is a retaliatory discharge cause of action
based on the exercise of self-defense in response to lethal imminent danger.0 5
it is conducted by an employer based upon a good faith, reasonable, and objective suspicion of
drug usage, or where the employee's job responsibility involves public safety or the safety of
others).
197 See Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1996).
198 480 S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1996).
199 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22 (securing an individual's "right to keep and bear arms
for the defense of self"); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (2000) (acknowledging the right to bear arms for
self-defense); see also W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21(e) (2000) (permitting the teaching of self-defense
techniques in civil rights context).
204 Feliciano cites the following cases: State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 (1882); State v. Hughes,
476 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1996); State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1981); State v. Miller,
102 S.E. 303 (W. Va. 1919); State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127 (1999); State v. Laura, 116 S.E. 251
(1923) (extending the right to defend oneself and to take the life of one's assailant to one's place
of business).
205 Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 8.
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However, since the West Virginia Supreme Court was answering a certified
question from the Northern District of West Virginia, the court never reached
the question of whether the facts of the case supported Feliciano's cause of ac-
tion for wrongful discharge based on substantial public policy.
206
In Justice Maynard's dissenting opinion in Feliciano, he articulated the
dangers caused by the recognition of a substantial public policy exception for
self-defense.0 7 First, Justice Maynard pointed out that instead of supporting a
substantial public policy interest, the court's holding will actually result in an
increased risk of harm to the public.20 8 He further indicated that 7-Eleven's
safety policies were enacted in order to keep store employees and innocent by-
standers safe from harm in the event of a robbery because employees who inter-
fere with robberies are more likely to injure themselves and others.209 Now,
instead of following the employer's safety procedures, an employee is free to
disregard those procedures and try to subdue a robber himself.
210
Justice Maynard also stated that employer no-fighting policies will be
discouraged because an employee discharged for violating those policies could
always invoke the substantial public policy exception for self-defense.21' It is
clear that the Feliciano decision puts store owners in a difficult position - safety
policies will not be upheld or encouraged by the courts, but suits brought by
employees and customers who are injured by the lack of safety policies will be
upheld, and will be costly to employers.22
4. Substantial Public Policy Based on Administrative Regulations
Sometimes the courts have looked to administrative agency regulations
as sources of substantial public policy. For example, there is a substantial pub-
lic policy in the State of West Virginia, embodied in West Virginia Code section
30-1-5(b) and sections 30-27-1 to -16 and the regulations established there-
under.21 3 These provisions supported a claim for wrongful discharge where an
employee was allegedly discharged for providing truthful information to an In-
vestigator for the Board of Barbers and Cosmetologists.214
206 Id. at 723.
207 Id. at 724 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See id. For a more thorough treatment of the Feliciano case, see Thomas Ewing, Note, Bad
Facts, Bad Law: Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc. and Self-Defense as a Substantial Public Policy, 106
W. VA. L. REV. 781 (2004).
213 Syl. Pt. 5, Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2000).
214 Id.
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Similarly, the staffing regulation, contained in regulations governing li-
censure of hospitals, was found to set forth a specific statement of a substantial
public policy that contemplates that a hospital unit will be properly staffed.
215
The public policy found in this regulation was "to accommodate the regulation's
directive to ensure that patients are protected from inadequate staffing practices
and to assure that medical care is provided to hospital patients, especially chil-
dren and young adolescents, who must depend upon others to protect their
medical interests and needs. 216
Conversely, if the source of the public policy is too vague, the court will
decline to find a substantial public policy in the regulation. 21 7 In Birthisel v.
Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 21 the discharge of a social worker by a hospi-
tal, for her refusal to enter data on master treatment plan for patients, including
some whose files were closed, did not violate the public policy of West Vir-
ginia.219 The hospital did not force the social worker to compromise her profes-
sional ethics standards, so as to overcome its right to discharge her at will.
220
There was no falsification of records involved, rather she was simply required to
transfer to the plan valid data contained in other records.22'
Birthisel held that to identify the sources of public policy for purposes
of determining whether a retaliatory discharge has occurred "we look to estab-
lished precepts in our constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved
regulations, and judicial opinions., 222 "Inherent in the term 'substantial public
policy' is the concept that the policy will provide specific guidance to a reason-
able person. 223 Regulations that are too vague to constitute substantial public
215 Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 554, 567 (W. Va. 1997) (Harless
claim based on W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 64-12-14.2.48 (1987), as amended in 1994).
216 Id.
217 See Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Serv. Corp, 424 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1992).
218 424 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1992).
219 Id. at 612-13.
220 Id. at 614.
Neither of these provisions contain [sic] any specific guidance. Their general
admonitions as to the requirement of good care for patients by social workers
do not constitute the type of substantial and clear public policy on which a re-
taliatory discharge claim can be based. If such a general standard could consti-
tute a substantial public policy, it would enable a social worker to make a
challenge to any type of procedure that the worker felt violated his or her
sense of good service.
Id. at 612-13.
221 Id.
222 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
223 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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policy cannot be the basis of a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 224 In this
case, the regulations were too vague to constitute substantial public policy.
225
However, there has been criticism of using regulatory minutia as a source of
"substantial public policy" in West Virginia because of the sheer volume of ad-
ministrative regulations in this state.226
5. Cases Finding Substantial Public Policy Based on Other
Reasons
This "other" category is specifically reserved for cases where (1) a
plaintiff attempted to articulate a "substantial public policy" but the source of
the policy is unknown or (2) where a statute specifically excluded the plaintiff
from its purview but the plaintiff nonetheless attempted to maintain a Harless
claim. For instance, in an answer to a certified question, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court held in Williamson v. Greene227 that even though a discharged
at-will employee has no statutory claim for retaliatory discharge under the
WVHRA, 2 8 the discharged employee might nevertheless maintain a common
law claim for retaliatory discharge against the employer.229 In Williamson, the
employer was not subject to the WVHRA because the employer did not employ
twelve or more persons within the state at the time the acts giving rise to the
alleged unlawful discriminatory practice were committed. 230 However, despite
224 Id. at 612.
225 ld. at 612-13.
226 See Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616, 624 (W. Va. 2000) (Maynard, C.J., dis-
senting) ("[A] substantial public policy now can be found in the most obscure and petty State
regulation and used to further erode the employment-at-will doctrine. When you consider that
executive agencies chum out rules like Stephen King chums out novels, this is a scary develop-
ment."). Justice Maynard also discussed the use of administrative regulations as the basis for
substantial public policy:
I agree with the appellants that the appellee failed, as a matter of law, to
show that any of her actions were in support of a substantial public policy
of the State .... I believe the West Virginia Code of State Regulations §
64-12-14.2.4 (1987) is simply too general and indefinite to be considered
a substantial public policy. When this Court chose the phrase "substantial
public policy". . . it was articulating the narrow parameters of an excep-
tion to the at will employment doctrine. The substantial public policy ex-
ception certainly does not encompass every broad policy pronouncement
found in the voluminous code of state regulations.
Tudor, 506 S.E.2d at 576 (Maynard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 490 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997).
228 W. VA. CODE §§ 5-1 I-1 to -21 (2000).
229 Williamson, 490 S.E.2d at 33.
230 Id. at 29-30. The employment of twelve or more persons is required by West Virginia Code
section 5-1 1-3(d) for an employer to be subject to the West Virginia Human Rights Act.
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the express language of the statute that excluded the employer, the employer
was still liable for the employee's discharge.23" ' The cause of action was allowed
based on a Harless claim, not a claim under the WVHRA, because the court
found that "sex discrimination and sexual harassment in employment contravene
the public policy of [West Virginia] articulated in the [WVHRA]. 232
However, in Travis v. Alcon Laboratories, lnc.,2 33 when a white male
under forty claimed harassment under the WVHRA, but was not discriminated
against based on any of the protected grounds under the WVHRA, the court held
that the WVHRA creates no general public policy against harassment in the
workplace for purposes of West Virginia wrongful discharge law.234 Other West
Virginia state and federal courts have declined to find a substantial public policy
in the discharge of employee for refusing to work on Sunday235 or for the dis-
charge of an employee because he has been accused of or indicted for a crime.
236
C. The Harless I Scheme of Proof
The scheme of proof in a Harless substantial public policy claim is the
same as the scheme of proof in a disparate treatment case and most other em-
ployment related causes of action.2 37 "[O]nce the plaintiff ... has established
the existence of such policy and established by a preponderance of the evidence
that an employment discharge was motivated by an unlawful factor contraven-
ing that policy, liability will then be imposed on a defendant unless the defen-
dant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the same result would have
occurred even in the absence of the unlawful motive. 238 Therefore, under this
scheme of proof, even if an employee can show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that there was an unlawful motivating factor in her termination, the em-
ployer could still prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, regardless of
any unlawful motive, the employee still would have been terminated. It would
231 id. at 33.
232 Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court, although not basing its decision on Harless, used a
similar "collateral doctrine" to allow persons under forty to maintain an action under the WVHRA
for age discrimination despite the express language of the statute defining "age" as persons over
forty. Bailey v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 527 S.E.2d 516, 533 (W. Va. 1999).
233 504 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1998).
234 Id. at 433.
235 Speelman v. Smith's Transfer Corp., No. 85-1883 (4th Cir. May 22, 1986) (unpublished
opinion).
236 Terry v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 84-C-3173 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct. January 17, 1987)
(Workman, J.); Sipe v. Shop'n Save Supermarkets, Inc., No. 87-0023-E(K) (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 28,
1987) (Kidd, J.); Burton v. The Pittston Co., No. 84-C-3387 (Raleigh Cty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 1987)
(Canterbury, J.).
237 See Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1996).
238 Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 829 (W. Va. 1996).
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then be up to the employee to show that the reasons given by the employer were
pretextual, and that the true reason for the discharge was founded in public pol-
icy.2 39 An example of how this scheme of proof has been applied is Yarnevic v.
Brink's, Inc. 240 In Yarnevic, a discharged employee argued that his decision to
report the embezzlement scheme to the FBI was a substantial public policy prin-
24 1ciple and that the discharge was, therefore, improper under Harless. A re-
taliatory discharge claim, however, fails if an employer proves that an employee
would have been terminated even if he had not engaged in the protected con-
duct.242 Because the district court found that Brink's had established legitimate,
nonpretextual reasons for the employee's discharge, the plaintiff could not
maintain his cause of action.243
VI. PROBLEMS WITH HARLESS I AND II AND THEIR PROGENY
A. Unpredictability
Professor Bastress of the West Virginia University College of Law has
noted that "[r]epresenting a client who seeks relief for an employment discharge
is a lot like playing bingo: you hope the client calls out facts that permit you to
maneuver the case into the right squares of forbidden employer motive or con-
duct in order to win a prize.', 244  By the same token, advising an employer
thinking of discharging an employee is equally as difficult. 245 Because of its
nature as an at-will relationship imposing no duties on the parties, at-will em-
239 See id. A similar scheme of proof has been applied where an employee claims discharge for
exercise of a constitutional right. See Syl. Pt. 3, McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 360 S.E.2d
221 (W. Va. 1987) ("In a retaliatory discharge action, where the plaintiff claims that he or she was
discharged for exercising his or her constitutional right(s), the burden is initially upon the plaintiff
to show that the exercise of his or her constitutional right(s) was a substantial or a motivating
factor for the discharge. The plaintiff need not show that the exercise of the constitutional right(s)
was the only precipitating factor for the discharge. The employer may defeat the claim by showing
that the employee would have been discharged even in the absence of the protected conduct.");
see also Syl. Pt. 9, Mace v. Charleston Area Med. Cent. Found., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va.
1992).
240 102 F.3d 753, 757 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding district court's decision finding that employer
provided legitimate, nonpretextual reasons for employee's discharge).
241 Id.
242 See id.
243 Id. at 757-58.
244 Bastress, supra note 9, at 319.
245 See Bobbi K. Dominick, What Is the Definition of "Public Policy" Wrongful Discharge?
Time for the Idaho Courts to Provide Guidance, Without Judicial Legislation, of Public Policy by
Interpreting the Wrongful Discharge Cause of Action, 35 IDAHO L. REV 285, 307 (1999) ("Em-
ployers need some method of determining, prior to acting, whether their conduct is likely to result
in liability.").
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ployment is a doctrine that theoretically should be easy to administer and pro-
vide guidance for employers and employees, as well as a bright-line rule for the
courts to follow, but "[r]ecent decades have brought significant change and un-
certainty to common-law principles governing employment termination. 246 In
the beginning, many courts were reluctant to adopt, or declined to adopt at all,
the tort of public policy wrongful discharge because it was "too nebulous" a
standard,247 but most states have now adopted the tort of public policy wrongful
discharge,2 48 adding the greatest exception to at-will termination of an em-
ployee.
Different jurisdictions find public policy in different sources. Some
courts require that the source of public policy for the purposes of retaliatory
discharge be a constitutional or statutory provision, while others allow adminis-
trative regulations and decisions, case law, and even professional codes of eth-
ics, 249 and still other courts have found public policy without a statutory or other
legal source. In a Washington case, where public policy was found not based
on any statutory or legal source, the dissenting Justice accused the Washington
court of creating an "other" category of public policy: "The result of the major-
ity's analysis is that the public policy exception to employment-at-will now ap-
plies to a fifth, completely incompatible category; that is, where this court dis-
agrees with an employer's definition of just cause . . ,. . Some courts have
also commented that this type of judicial legislation gives judges an opportunity
"to apply their own personal views of what is right and wrong.'
252
246 Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631,
632 (1988) (Employment-at-will "has experienced great erosion, leaving uncertainty and wide
variations in law between the states.").
247 Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Ala. 1977).
248 See Ballam, supra note 39, at 664.
249 See Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1052 n.4 (Cal. 1998) ("For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court favored broadly defining public policy exceptions: 'The sources of
public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial deci-
sions. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public pol-
icy.' By contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court held that wrongful discharge tort actions must be
based on public policies found in statutes or constitutional provisions.") (quotation and citation
omitted).
250 See, e.g., Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 386 (Wash. 1996) (finding that
discharging an employee "for leaving the truck and saving a woman from an imminent life threat-
ening situation violates the public policy encouraging such heroic conduct.").
251 Id. at 387 (Madsen, J., dissenting). Justice Madsen also notes similar criticisms to those in
Feliciano: "Relying on a dubious formulation of public policy, the majority today invalidates a
company work rule designed to protect the lives of men and women employed as drivers in the
unique and highly dangerous occupation of operating armored cars." Id.
252 Dominick, supra note 245, at 285 n.3; see, e.g., Md.-Nat'l Captial Park & Planning
Comm'n v. Wash. Nat'l Arena, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228 (Md. 1978) ("Judges are frequently called
upon to discern the dictates of sound social policy and human welfare based on nothing more than
their own personal experience and intellectual capacity.").
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B. Restriction of Private Freedoms
Whether public policy is defined broadly or narrowly affects the level of
intrusion on the employer. "In its narrowest form, public policy must be derived
from clear and specific legislation designed to protect employees in their jobs..
Under this standard, courts assume very little discretion in identifying public
policy and only minimally intrude on employer prerogatives. '' 53 Conversely, a
broad definition of public policy finds public policy in legislative history, ad-
ministrative regulations, common law, and other sources.254 The dangers of this
type of broad approach to finding public policy was recognized by the Wiscon-
sin court in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,255 where the court held that the
public policy must be found in a constitutional or statutory provision.256 The
court recognized that "[c]ourts should proceed cautiously when making public
policy determinations. ' 257 "No employer should be subject to suit merely be-
cause a discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy or because the public
may have derived some benefit from it."'258 Without clearly defined public pol-
icy standards, the employer is left wondering if what was simply a dispute be-
tween the employee and the employer will be found to violate public policy.
2 59
In looking at various examples of substantial public policy recognized
by the West Virginia Supreme Court, protecting citizens of West Virginia from
everything from trucks with bad brakes2 60 to what Justice Maynard termed "a
bad haircut" in Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc.,26 1 it appears that West Virginia
takes a broad view of what constitutes public policy. In his dissent in Kanagy,
Justice Maynard recognized that West Virginia has defined what constitutes a
substantial public policy too broadly:
253 Bastress, supra note 9, at 331.
254 See Green, 960 P.2d at 105 1-52.
255 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
256 Id. at 840.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1980) ("The
issue then becomes ... deciding where ... to draw the line between claims that genuinely involve
the mandates of public policy ... and ordinary disputes between employee and employer ... ").
260 See, e.g., Lilly v. Overnight Transp. Co., 425 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1992) (recognizing an
employee's refusal to drive a truck with bad brakes as a substantial public policy in the state of
West Virginia).
261 541 S.E.2d 616, 623-24 (W. Va. 2000) (Maynard, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for finding a substantial public policy in providing truthful information, in compliance with the
requirements of a West Virginia Board of Barbers and Cosmetologists regulation).
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While I deplore a bad haircut as much as the next person, I am
confident that I can protect myself from a bad haircut without
the government's assistance. In sum, this case makes bad law
because it establishes that a substantial public policy now can
be found in the most obscure and petty State regulation and
used to further erode the employment-at-will doctrine.262
Substantial public policy should be used sparingly because it restricts
private dealings for the public good:
The power to declare an action against public policy is a broad
power and one difficult to define. 'No fixed rule can be given to
determine what is public policy. It is sometimes defined as that
principle of law under which freedom of contract or private
dealings are restricted by law for the good of the community--
the public good. 
263
Because it restricts private freedoms, the policy must "provide specific
guidance to a reasonable person.2
An employer should not be exposed to liability where a public
policy standard is too general to provide any specific guidance
or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations.... 265
Courts have usually looked to statutes for substantial public policy and
are aware of the dangers of stretching public policy too far.266 Finding public
policy in the Constitution poses the greatest threat to employers:
The recognition of constitutional provisions as a source of limi-
tation on private employers could provide a most significant
expansion, particularly through protection of employees who
promote controversial or unpopular causes. In addition, em-
ployees' rights of privacy could also add a significant limitation
262 Id. at 624.
263 Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204, 209 (W. Va. 1985) (quoting Higgins v.
McFarland, 86 S.E.2d 168 (Va. 1955)).
264 Syl. Pt. 3, Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1992).
265 Id. at 612.
266 See id. at 611 ("Most of our retaliatory discharge cases involve violations of statutes that we
deem to articulate a substantial public policy.").
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on employers' abilities to discharge employees for their off-
duty activities.
267
The West Virginia Supreme Court has on rare occasions recognized a
substantial public policy from the common law or the Constitution,268 but has
yet to recognize a substantial public policy emanating from the Freedom of
Speech clause in the West Virginia Constitution to support a claim for retalia-
tory discharge.269 However, public policy based on administrative regulations
also presents the same dangers of unpredictability and vagueness as finding pub-
lic policy in the Constitution or the common law due to the sheer number of
such regulations and the minute details covered in the regulations.27 °
C. Tort Damage Awards
Because an action for wrongful discharge is a tort action, the Supreme
Court held in Harless II that tort damages apply.27' Despite the employee's duty
to mitigate damages, allowing tort damages in retaliatory discharge actions can
be costly to employers.272 In a contract action, damages are usually limited to
compensatory damages, seeking to give the parties the benefit of their bar-
gain.273 Conversely, in a tort action for wrongful discharge, emotional distress
and even punitive damages are available against an employer.274 The employer
is also at a disadvantage in defending these types of cases because juries may
identify themselves with the employee.275 For example, in Page, the jury
awarded the plaintiff approximately $280,000 in damages, which included
$130,000 for past economic damages and $150,000 in emotional distress dam-
267 Bastress, supra note 9, at 334.
268 See, e.g., Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001).
269 See Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Center, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1998) (holding
that an employee did not have a public policy wrongful discharge cause of action against a private
employer emanating from the free speech clause of the state constitution).
270 This is especially "scary" "[w]hen you consider that executive agencies chum out rules like
Stephen King chums out novels." Kanagy, 541 S.E.2d at 624 (Maynard, C.J., dissenting).
271 See Harless II, 289 S.E.2d 692, 698 (W. Va. 1982); Harless I, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 n.5 (W.
Va. 1978).
272 See Seymour v. Pendleton Community Care, 549 S.E.2d 662 (W. Va. 2001) (per curiam)
(reinstating damages in the amount of $526,000 in retaliatory discharge action despite employee's
failure to mitigate damages); see also Jarsulic, supra note 23 (discussing Montana's use of em-
ployment termination act and the difference between the contract damages under the act and the
higher tort damages in states using a tort system for wrongful discharge).
273 See Jarsulic, supra note 23.
274 See Harless II, 289 S.E.2d at 692.
275 See Joseph C. Telezinski, Jr., Without Warning - The Danger of Protecting "Whistleblow-
ers " Who Don't Blow the Whistle, 27 W. ST. U.L. REV 397, 397 (2000).
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ages.276 The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed this award.277 The court
gave deference to the fact-finders in the case in reaching their verdict.278 De-
spite its affirmance, the Supreme Court suggested that the "question of whether
Mrs. Page was terminated in retaliation for her testimony is not strikingly obvi-
ous from the record in [the] case. 279
Damages for emotional distress can be given in a Harless action even in
the absence of any direct supporting evidence.28° In Page, the court concluded
that testimony by Mrs. Page, her husband, and three other individuals as to her
emotional symptoms was enough to justify a $150,000 award for emotional dis-
tress. 281 Appealing these outrageous awards is often futile. Courts in West Vir-
ginia will not set aside a jury verdict as excessive unless it is "monstrous, enor-
mous, at first blush beyond all measure, unreasonable, outrageous and mani-
festly show[s] jury passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. 282 Any damage
award that does not meet this extremely harsh standard will be upheld on ap-
peal.283
Also despite a plaintiffs duty to mitigate damages in a Harless ac-
tion,2 4 the West Virginia Supreme Court has upheld awards of lost wages, emo-
tional distress and even punitive damages where the plaintiff did not apply for
one job in a twenty month period.285 In Seymour v. Pendleton Community Care,
276 Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 823 (W. Va. 1996).
277 Id. at 822.
278 Id. at 827.
279 Id. Also, the court mentions in its opinion that Mrs. Page stole a document from her em-
ployer and that the unemployment commission found that she had been terminated for gross mis-
conduct.
280 See Mace v. Charleston Area Med. Cent. Found., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va. 1992).
281 Page, 480 S.E.2d at 835 ("Even in the absence of direct evidence supporting the claim of
emotional distress, the Mace court declined to disturb the jury's award of emotional distress dam-
ages. Consequently, we find that Mrs. Page's testimony regarding the emotional symptoms she
suffered as a result of her termination, along with the supporting testimony of her husband and
three other individuals was sufficient evidence upon which to base this damage award.").
282 Syl. Pt., Addair v. Majestic Petroleum Co., Inc., 232 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1977).
283 See Seymour v. Pendleton Community Care, 549 S.E.2d 662 (W. Va. 2001) (per curiam)
(reversing trial court's reduction of jury verdict, and reinstating damages in the amount of
$526,000 in retaliatory discharge action).
284 Syl. Pt. 2, Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 295 S.E.2d 719
(W. Va. 1982) ("Unless a wrongful discharge is malicious, the wrongfully discharged employee
has a duty to mitigate damages by accepting similar employment to that contemplated by his or
her contract if it is available in the local area, and the actual wages received, or the wages the
employee could have received at comparable employment where it is locally available, will be
deducted from any back pay award; however, the burden of raising the issue of mitigation is on
the employer."). On the other hand, where a discharge is malicious, the employer is estopped
from asserting the employee's duty to mitigate. See id. at 725.
285 Seymour, 549 S.E.2d at 662 (reversing trial judge's reduction in jury award for failure to
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a jury damage award was upheld even though the plaintiff had failed to apply
for a job within the twenty-month period between her termination and the trial
and had earned less than one hundred dollars making stained glass at home dur-
ing that period.286 These so-called "attempts" to mitigate her damages were
upheld despite the fact that they did not seem diligent or reasonable. 87
D. Laissez-Faire Economics, Economic Efficiency, and Freedom of
Contract
Some jurisdictions prefer a stricter at-will employment doctrine because
it is economically efficient and promotes freedom of contract, two guiding prin-
ciples of Anglo-American jurisprudence.288 On the other hand, the tort of public
policy discharge can be economically inefficient and burden the parties' free-
dom to contract. Consider an example of the economic inefficiency of the
Harless doctrine. A husband and wife decide to open a business and responsi-
bly learn the myriad regulations covering employment and the uncertainty of the
Harless doctrine. One of their employees is excessively absent. When he does
show up, he comes into work late all the time, leaves early, and takes a long
lunch. The couple needs some advice. They want to terminate the at-will em-
ployee, but there is a problem. Two months ago the employee gave testimony in
an unrelated legal proceeding involving the store. The couple is now afraid to
terminate the worthless employee because he may bring suit and claim that he
has been discharged for giving truthful testimony in a legal proceeding. Not
wanting to involve themselves in expensive litigation, and risk a jury verdict
against them, the couple keeps the worthless employee. The West Virginia Su-
preme Court has recognized the "obvious merit" to the argument that the finding
of a public policy "binds the hands of an employer" with regard to that em-
ployee. 289 However, the court felt that this imposition on the employer was
mitigate damages and reinstating jury award).
286 See id. at 668 (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Mrs. Seymour, in her
own defense, testified with regard to her attempt to mitigate her damages: "I've watched the
paper, and I've kept my eye on things -- and kept an eye for what's out there, and kept my eyes
open. I just haven't gone to apply." Id. at 664.
287 See id. at 668 (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In the Mason County
case, we explained vis-a-vis mitigation that 'the wrongfully discharged employee who has not
secured employment must be prepared to demonstrate that he or she did not make a voluntary
decision not to work, but rather used reasonable and diligent efforts to secure acceptable employ-
ment."' ).
288 See generally Epstein, supra note 20, at 951 (maintaining that at-will contract is supported
by principles of freedom of contract and rules of construction).
289 Page v. Columbia Natural Res., 480 S.E. 2d 817, 826 (W. Va. 1996) ("We are also mindful
of appellants' assertion that any endorsement of a public policy against discharge for giving testi-
mony in a legal proceeding 'binds the hands of an employer' with respect to any employee who so
testifies. We understand the thrust of that argument to be that our recognition of such a public
policy will shield employee wrongdoers from discipline or discharge, in effect because whenever
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outweighed by the public policy at issue in the case - the giving of truthful tes-
timony. 290 These decisions show a paternalistic side of the courts, carving out
exceptions into the at-will doctrine believing that employees cannot protect
themselves on their own while forcing employers to stand on their own two
feet.29'
E. Unilateral Application
The doctrine of at-will employment is "cast in mutuality, affording to
the employee as well as employer the right of at-will termination .... One
of the difficulties with the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine is that it
creates added responsibilities for only one side of a two-sided relationship. An
employee at-will has always been free to quit his or her job and look for em-
ployment elsewhere. That employee does not have to show cause, and can even
quit his or her job for a reason that would seem to violate a substantial public
policy. 293 Under strict at-will employment, employers had the same freedom.
294
an employee has so testified, whether truthfully or not, any subsequent discharge will be subject to
challenge on public policy grounds. In the practical scheme of things, there is obvious merit to
appellants' position. However, such an objection may be raised to practically every ground that
may be asserted in a Harless type action.").
290 Id. ("We cannot conclude that the unfettered discharge of at-will employees ought to take
precedence over the search for truth, free of the threat of retaliatory discharge, especially where a
means is available to distinguish proper reasons for discharge from retaliation.").
291 See Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge--A Quadrennial As-
sessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW 1 (1984) ("Socioeconomic and equali-
tarian arguments, advanced in an incessant stream of legal commentary, have also persuaded some
courts of the need for change. The nature of the employment relationship is said to have under-
gone a radical change since the at-will rule won acceptance at the turn-of-the-century and flour-
ished in the laissez-faire milieu of the early 1900s. Today's employees are perceived to be more
dependent on their corporate employers for economic survival, while in the nonunion situation,
they suffer from a marked inferiority of bargaining power, which debilitates them from protecting
themselves against unfair terminations. Moreover, the proponents of change perceive an inequity
in job security between unionized and nonunionized employees and argue that employers' wide-
spread acceptance of collectively bargained restrictions on their discharge rights should pave the
way for redressing, via the common law, these inequalities and inequities.") (citing Scholtes v.
Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 493-94 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876, 878 (1IU. 1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980)).
292 Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 214 (S.C. 1985). For a discus-
sion of the tort of wrongful discharge in South Carolina, see generally Melanie Robin Galberry,
Employers Beware: South Carolina's Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Doc-
trine Is Likely to Keep Expanding, 51 S.C. L. REv 406 (2000).
293 For instance, a securities broker who works on commission may want to violate certain
Securities Exchange Act regulations in order to increase his commission. If his employer tells the
employee not to violate the act, the employee is still free to quit his job because he believes his
firm is "too strict" or "too ethical" when it comes to following these regulations. The employer
has no cause of action against the employee for "wrongful resignation" based on violation of
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In fact, in the early 1900's the United States Supreme Court held that the right
of an employer to terminate an employee at-will was constitutionally protected
because an employer could not be required to retain an employee against his
will any more than an employee could be forced to work against his will.
295
Now, besides the state and federal statutes governing private employers, the
public policy cause of action further ties the hands of employers to make impor-
tant decisions concerning their business.
F. Lack of Deference to the Legislature
In the early days of the tort of retaliatory discharge, many courts con-
cluded that "the meaning of 'contrary to public policy' was simply 'too nebu-
lous' to justify the judicial creation of a new tort., 29 6 Many courts took the posi-
tion that the exceptions to at-will employment "are best and most appropriately
explored and resolved by the legislative branch of our government., 297 Today,
some courts still believe that substantial public policy should only be found in
those things about which "there is a virtual unanimity of opinion, 298 and that
any "issue which is fairly debatable or controversial in nature is one for the leg-
islature and not for [the courts] .,,299 In Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,3°° the
court recognized the importance of restraint in this area:
substantial public policy. Conversely, if the employer wanted the broker to violate provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act, but the employee refused and was discharged, the employee could
arguably maintain a Harless claim against the employer.
294 See Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Co., 62 S.E.2d. 285, 288 (W. Va. 1950) (holding that
without contractual provisions to the contrary employment may be terminated with or without
cause at the will of either party); see also Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Bd., 29
P.3d 543, 545 (Okla. 2001) ("Notions of fundamental fairness underlie the concept of mutuality
which extends a corresponding freedom to the employer."); Ludwick, 337 S.E.2d at 214. See gen-
erally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that "the employee was free to quit and seek alternate
employment whenever he or she wanted, and the employer was free to fire the employee at any
time.").
295 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
172-75 (1908). These cases were overruled in the case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that an employer may be liable for wrongful termination for discharg-
ing an employee exercising his legal right to participate in a union). See generally Note, Protect-
ing Employees at Will against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1931, 1933 (1983).
296 Ballam, supra note 39, at 661.
297 Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983).
298 Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E. 2d 204, 209 (W. Va. 1985) (quoting Mamlin v. Ge-
noe, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941)).
299 Id.
300 396 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1990).
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We have exercised the power to declare an employer's conduct
as contrary to public policy with restraint, and have deferred
to the West Virginia legislature because it "has the primary re-
sponsibility for translating public policy into law." 302
The Fourth Circuit has also recognized the importance of deference to
the West Virginia legislature: "The power to declare an employer's conduct as
contrary to public policy is to be exercised with restraint, and with due defer-
ence to the West Virginia legislature as the primary organ of public policy in the
state. 30 3 Hence, these courts recognize that if the legislature has not put a cause
of action for wrongful discharge into a piece of legislation, it may be because
the legislature did not intend to do so, and if there is no statute supporting a par-
ticular public policy, it may be because the legislature has not recognized that as
a public policy of the state. Similarly, if the legislature has limited the applica-
bility of a certain act to employers with only twelve or fewer employees, there
must be a reason for the limitation.
Cases such as Williamson v. Greene304 and Bailey v. Norfolk & Western
Railway Co.30 5 exemplify judicial legislation in the area of wrongful discharge.
In Williamson, the court effectively lifted the small business exemption of the
WVHRA by holding an employer with less than twelve employees liable under
a Harless claim public policy exception despite the lack of a constitutional,
statutory, administrative, or common law basis.306 The decision in Williamson
could also allow plaintiff employees to maintain a Harless claim where their
employers fail to meet the definition of an "employer" under the WVHRA for
other reasons, such as an independent contractor relationship. This misuse of
the Harless cause of action renders definitions and exceptions contained in the
WVHRA meaningless and expands the scope of the Act beyond what the legis-
lature intended.
Other courts have similarly lifted small business exceptions by holding
that the exemption of small businesses by the legislature is to relieve the bur-
dens of administrative compliance only, and not from the antidiscrimination
301 See also Yoho, 336 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 3 ("Ordinarily the courts will not decide on public
policy grounds issues which are fairly debatable, but will instead leave them for legislative deci-
sion.").
302 Shell, 396 S.E.2d at 180 (citations omitted).
303 Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1989).
304 490 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997).
305 527 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1999). In Bailey, although not a Harless case, the court used the
"collateral victim doctrine" to allow persons under forty to maintain a suit for age discrimination
under the WVHRA although the Act dictates that "age discrimination" under the WVHRA means
discrimination against a person based on their status as a person over forty. Id. at 533.
306 See Williamson, 490 S.E.2d at 33.
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provisions of the acts.3 °7 These courts have therefore allowed wrongful dis-
charge claims based on public policy grounds, despite the fact that the legisla-
ture specifically exempted small businesses. 30 8 One dissenting justice has char-
acterized this type of expansion as "an egregious and inexcusable abuse of judi-
cial power," because the court defied "clear and specific legislative enact-
11309ments.
G. Abuse by Disgruntled Employees
The West Virginia Supreme Court has held that " [i]t is against substan-
tial public policy of West Virginia to discharge an at-will employee because
such employee has given or may be called to give truthful testimony in a legal
action." 310 In Page, an employee was allegedly terminated for deposition testi-
mony in a wrongful discharge case.311 In its reasoning, the Page court acknowl-
edges that sometimes unscrupulous employees who are terminated for legitimate
reasons will try and use this public policy exception to their advantage, but feels
that this misuse is outweighed by the public interest in protecting truthful testi-
mony.3
12
Justice Neely has also recognized that the substantial public policy ex-
ception held potential for abuse by disgruntled employees. In his dissent in
Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., Neely points out that "[t]he plaintiff here has used
Harless as the basis for a cause of action which on its face seems groundless...
I submit that this is a nuisance lawsuit made possible only by the improvident
holding in Harless."313 Thus, the potential for a legitimately terminated em-
ployee to come up with some reason for her termination based on the substantial
policy exception has long been recognized. This kind of deception is to be ex-
pected with an exception that is so broadly defined.
307 See, e.g., Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 661 (Ohio 1995) (holding that legislature's
intent was "to exempt small businesses from the burdens of [administrative compliance], not from
the antidiscrimination policy").
308 See Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996) (holding that small business exemp-
tion was from administrative process only); Collins, 652 N.E.2d 653. See generally Ballam, supra
note 39, at 678-79.
309 Payne v. Rosendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 592 (Vt. 1986).
310 Syl. Pt. 4, Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1996).
311 Id. at 821.
312 Id.
313 Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 684 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting) (re-
taliatory discharge claim based on termination for reporting accidents to the Mine Enforcement
Safety Administration).
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The current system obviously leaves employers wondering what kinds
of behaviors subject them to liability for wrongful discharge and leaves many
employees unprotected from arbitrary adverse employment action. With that
said, the question becomes how to fashion a workable solution that balances the
legitimate and sometimes competing interests of employees and employers in
West Virginia. One obvious solution would be to return to truly at-will em-
ployment where an employee could be discharged for good, bad, or no reason.
This solution may promote mutuality, freedom of contract, and laissez-faire
economics. However, despite its practicality and ease of application, this solu-
tion ignores the public's legitimate interest in keeping employers from terminat-
ing their employees in contravention of the substantial public policies of the
state as well as an employee's legitimate interest in being free from such ill-
motivated discharges.
Another solution would be to retain the Harless exception, but provide
a clearer definition of what constitutes a public policy substantial enough to
override at-will employment and subject an employer to liability for retaliatory
discharge. This option could include restricting the sources of the public policy
to those that have been clearly articulated in a constitution, statute, or common
law. Keeping administrative regulations, obligations of professional responsi-
bility, and general notions of what constitutes public policy out of the Harless
framework would go a long way to provide some needed guidance and restraint.
The definition of "public policy" could even be restricted to constitutional pro-
visions or statutes, or further yet, to "a policy in effect at the time of the dis-
charge concerning the public health, safety, or welfare established by constitu-
tional provision or statute."3t 4 This latter solution would 1) involve due exercise
314 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(7) (2002). The Montana statute also defines administra-
tive rule as a source of public policy. This has been removed from the definition used and recom-
mended in this article as administrative regulations, especially at a state level, are promulgated by
an unelected fourth branch of government and too numerous to constitute a "substantial" public
policy. See Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616, 624 (Maynard, C. J., dissenting) ("[A]
substantial public policy now can be found in the most obscure and petty State regulation and used
to further erode the employment-at-will doctrine. When you consider that executive agencies
churn out rules like Stephen King chums out novels, this is a scary development."). Justice May-
nard also discussed the use of administrative regulations as the basis for substantial public policy:
I agree with the appellants that the appellee failed, as a matter of law, to
show that any of her actions were in support of a substantial public policy
of the State .... I believe the West Virginia Code of State Regulations §
64-12-14.2.4 (1987) is simply too general and indefinite to be considered
a substantial public policy. When this Court chose the phrase "substantial
public policy" . . . it was articulating the narrow parameters of an excep-
tion to the at will employment doctrine. The substantial public policy ex-
ception certainly does not encompass every broad policy pronouncement
found in the voluminous code of state regulations.
Tudor, 506 S.E.2d at 576 (Maynard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of judicial restraint; 2) defer to the legislature on matters of creating public pol-
icy for the state of West Virginia; 3) resolve some of the unpredictability and
ambiguity created by the current state of the law; and 4) restrict Harless actions
to those based on currently existing and clearly articulated public policy. This
definitional approach would further curb some of the abuse by disgruntled em-
ployees who misuse Harless as a fallback position to other employment protec-
tions by making it more difficult for an employee to prevail on such a theory.
However, simply narrowing the definition of public policy offers employers
little protection from litigation expenses, tort damages, and outrageous jury
awards once a cause of action is stated under the new definition.
In the alternative, West Virginia could adopt legislation constituting a
compromise position - an equitable tradeoff of the competing interests of em-
ployers and employees. To balance the need for employee protection from un-
scrupulous terminations with an employer's need for protection from run-away
jury verdicts, the state of Montana passed the Wrongful Discharge from Em-
ployment Act in 1987.315 Prior to the Act, Montana, like West Virginia, recog-
nized the tort of wrongful discharge, but was having the same problems as West
Virginia - large jury awards, high defense costs, and uncertainty as to the exact
parameters of the law. The Montana Act gives rise to a cause of action for ter-
minations that, among other things, are in retaliation for an employee's refusal
to violate public policy. 31 6  Additionally, Montana's statute creates a "just
cause" standard of review for most termination cases and encourages arbitration
and exhaustion of internal remedies. 31 7 This law replaces the at-will doctrine in
Montana and severely limits remedies available to employees. Since the enact-
ment of the Wrongful Discharge Act in Montana, significant effects have oc-
curred. One effect is that the average award in a wrongful termination act was
reduced from $166,700 to $36,800.318 Part of this reduction comes from the fact
that damages under the Act are based on the employee's level of income and not
on a jury's estimation of damages. 319 Another effect is that the average time for
employment litigation decreased from four years to two years after the passage
of the Montana Act.
320
In addition to Montana's legislative alternative, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State laws drafted and approved the Model Em-
315 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2002). Administrative regulation has been re-
moved as a source of public policy.
316 See id.
317 See id.
318 See Jarsulic, supra note 23 (discussing Montana's use of employment termination act and
the difference between contract damages under the act and the higher tort damages in states using
a tort system for wrongful discharge).
319 See id.
320 See id.
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ployment Termination Act ("Model Act") in August 1991.321 The primary pur-
pose of the Model Act is to provide uniformity in employment termination
among the states that adopt it.322 Such efficiency and predictability is significant
to an employer because the employer "benefits from being able to have stan-
dardized personnel policies that would be effective beyond state lines., 323 Simi-
lar to the Montana Act, the Model Act changes the underlying nature of the em-
ployment relationship, providing as a general rule that "an employer may not
terminate the employment of an employee without good cause." 324 The Model
Act also includes mandatory arbitration provisions and an opt-out provision that
allows an employee to opt out of coverage by agreeing to a guaranteed schedule
325
of graduated severance payments.
In West Virginia, this legislation could take the form of an "Employ-
ment Termination Act," modeled after the Montana Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act and the Uniform Law commissioners' Model Employment
Termination Act, taking the best parts from each. The West Virginia Act could
be designed to work with existing federal and state statutes governing employ-
ment discharge, but preempt all actions arising in tort, express contract (except
for a written contract for a term) or implied contract. The Act could further pro-
vide that if an employee has any other remedy available, the employee cannot
maintain a cause of action under the Act. The legislation would set forth rights
and remedies with respect to wrongful discharge and provide the exclusive rem-
edy for a wrongful discharge from employment in West Virginia.
The legislation would have a dual purpose. First, it would create a
statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge that would protect West Vir-
ginia employees from arbitrary discharge. At the same time, the legislation
could potentially save West Virginia employers thousands of dollars every year
in excessive jury awards and litigation expenses by removing tort damages from
the mix of available remedies, prohibiting emotional distress damages, limiting
damages to back pay and benefits or reinstatement, and either prohibiting or
providing a cap on punitive damages. The legislation could also encourage or
require arbitration and the exhaustion of internal remedies, further discouraging
litigation and promoting compromise. Another advantage would be a shorter
321 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, available at http://www.nccusl.org. The
findings of the NCCUSL indicate that nationwide, in the last several years, wrongful termination
cases have increased 400%, and that in California, plaintiffs won 70% or more and averaged be-
tween $300,000 -- $500,000 in damages, that attorneys' fees and expenses add on at least another
$70,000. The findings also cite another study, done several years ago, that compared the litigation
costs of an employment suit to the recovery and found that the average employee recovery was
$125,000, but that the average litigation expenses were $164,000. See generally Theodore J. St.
Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH. L. REV. 361 (1994).
322 See id.
323 See id.
324 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 321.
325 See id.
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statute of limitations period applicable to a Harless claim, encouraging the
prompt filing of any claim under the Act. All in all, if carefully drafted, this
legislation could provide a "win-win" situation for all involved -- employees
would be granted an expanded substantive right to "good cause" protections
against discharge while the range of available remedies for wrongful discharge
would be sharply limited. Not only could this legislation obviate the need for a
Harless-type cause of action, but it could also preempt all causes of action by an
employee against his employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of an implied employment contract (created either by an employer's oral
statement or by a written personnel manual), breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (not yet adopted in West Virginia) and defamation.
Therefore, this legislation, if properly crafted, could bring fairness, balance, and
much needed clarity into the employer-employee relationship.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the court's holdings in Harless I and II, numerous cases have
been decided based on Harless-type claims. These cases find (or sometimes do
not find) substantial public policy to support a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge in the state and federal constitution, state and federal statutes, administra-
tive agency regulations, the common law, as well as other less well-defined
sources even when a statute expressly exempts an employer from its provisions.
Despite Harless I's requirement of "substantial" public policy, the courts have
been willing to find "substantial" public policy in regulatory minutia. Accord-
ingly, as applied, the Harless doctrine is (1) unfair and unpredictable to employ-
ers; (2) difficult for courts to administer; (3) a usurpation of the legislative
power; and (4) economically inefficient. Because of the ambiguity, ineffi-
ciency, and unfairness of the doctrine, the courts in West Virginia should restrict
the scope of the exception and return to a more traditional at-will employment
analysis. In the alternative, the court should more precisely define what consti-
tutes a "substantial public policy" that would support a cause of action for re-
taliatory discharge, or the legislature should act to balance the sometimes com-
peting interests of the employer and employee in West Virginia.
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